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Religion-based ‘Personal’ Law, Legal Pluralism  
and Secularity
A Field View of Adjudication under Muslim Personal Law  
in India
“Talaaq to day rahay ho Nazar-e-qehar ke saath 
Jawani bhi meri lauta do Mehr ke saath.”
(As you divorce me with rage in your eyes 
I want back my youth along with my alimony.)
Meena Kumari (Indian actress)
Introduction
In a matrimonial dispute that we came across in 2015, a woman approached 
the Darul-Qaza (also known as the Sharia court) in Kanpur. Her complaint 
was against her husband who had remarried, leaving her and two children 
to fend for themselves. She had a ruling from the Kanpur Family Court that 
allocated maintenance for her children but this had very soon proved inef-
fective as her husband had stopped paying the stipulated amount. When he 
was summoned to the Darul-Qaza, the husband argued that he had bought 
an apartment and registered it in the plaintiff ’s name. The wife alleged that 
her husband had been refusing to divorce her because of their children 
and yet was negligent to them. The qazi arbitrated and negotiated between 
the parties, and a settlement was drawn up that ordered the husband to 
bear the responsibility of his wife and children. When the husband failed 
to fulfil his promises, he was summoned again. The qazi reminded him 
of the agreement and warned him that if he again faltered in fulfilling his 
financial commitment, the qazi would invoke faskh1 and dissolve the mar-
riage. In India, where religion-based personal (family) law is followed, the 
sites of adjudication are civil courts. There are also scattered Darul-Qaza 
and other religious adjudication sites which function as alternative dispute 
resolution sites. In the case described above, the plaintiff had a ruling from 
the Family Court but when her husband did not honour the ruling, she 
1 A divorce invoked by a qazi where the husband’s consent is not required.
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approached the Darul-Qaza. The petitioner exercised her agency to pursue 
her case at a religious forum to achieve the desired outcome.
In this paper, we show how this plural legal landscape is negotiated by 
litigants, especially women, and thereby illustrate the procedural interplay 
between civil and religious courts through this adjudication process. The 
ethnography of adjudication at the Darul-Qaza situated in a large Muslim 
neighbourhood in Kanpur and the institution’s intersections with the so-
cietal (We mean the tribunals that function at the neighbourhood or com-
munity level) secular courts show how Muslim personal law functions. In 
this paper, we identify both the links between the Darul-Qaza and civil 
courts, and the processes of evidence making and legal reasoning that are 
integral to this interlegality. We argue that the issue of personal law should 
be understood within the post-colonial legal structure of India and with a 
good understanding of the processes through which disputes in the deli- 
cate area of family, affect and kinship are addressed and resolved. The 
above case shows how resolution occurs in a family dispute when plural 
institutional mechanisms are at work. This paper explores the adjudication 
process at a Darul-Qaza to understand how religion-based family laws get 
constituted as litigants seek both religious counsel and civil authority.
In post-colonial multicultural nation-states, the judiciary must strike a 
balance between ‘legal universalism’, which is invested in the idea of uni-
versal citizenship, and ‘legal pluralism’ through affirmation of the rights 
of religious minority groups and socially backward communities.2 In such 
societies, the dialectic between the law and custom, and thus between the 
political secularism of the state and the religious practices of multicultural 
social groups, raises questions about the concept of secularity itself. This 
paper looks at adjudication processes in Muslim personal law to under-
stand how religion-based family law functions through social, religious and 
state courts to mitigate disputes and deliver ‘justice’ to the parties involved. 
Scholars of legal pluralism have often argued in favour of a shift from the 
study of doctrine to that of legal practice, to the institutional aspects of 
law, judicial processes and the litigants’ viewpoints. However, empirical re-
search on this subject is scant. Ethnographic research in India has rarely 
2 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, “Living with Difference in India: Legal 
Pluralism and Legal Universalism in Historical Context,” in Religion and Personal Law 
in Secular India: A Call to Judgment, ed. Gerald James Larson (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001), 36–38.
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engaged with the following questions: how do the practitioners reconcile 
their personal laws with the directives of a modern constitution or the stip-
ulations of its legal imperatives? How do adjudication and the modality of 
decision-making help us comprehend the balancing between the law, reli-
gious codes, and local customs by the qazis and judges? And finally, what 
does this plural legal landscape suggest about the concept of secularity in a 
multicultural, constitutionally secular post-colonial nation-state?
Though feminist scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s drew attention 
to the dichotomous situation between state and non-state law in India, 
there has been little scholarship on the complex interactions in the realm 
of ideas and discourses between state law and the wider realm of cultural 
practices that are constitutive of the Muslim personal law.3 The literature 
on legal pluralism has introduced new frames for understanding the rela-
tionship between state law and personal legal systems.4 In this paper, we 
argue along this line of ethnographic work, rather than revisiting the Uni-
form Civil Code (UCC) versus personal law debate in India. This discourse 
revolves around concerns for the unity and integrity of the post-colonial 
nation-state as well as minority rights and gender justice. What has not 
been addressed is how religion-based family laws and disputes in the do-
main of marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance are resolved in practice.
The history of Muslim personal law in India has long included par-
liamentary debates, activism by right groups and law-making. However, 
the narrative has paid scant attention to social configurations of law and 
processes of conflict resolution. This paper is an attempt to focus on inter-
pretations of Muslim personal law and their everyday implications in dis-
pute resolution. How does Muslim personal law actually work in matters 
of marriage, divorce and inheritance? How often do litigants use a combi-
nation of civil law and social and religious forums to address and resolve 
their familial conflicts? As this paper shows, we need to understand the 
broad socio-legal landscape that covers disputes under Muslim personal 
law. Drawing on cases brought to the Darul-Qaza in the city of Kanpur, 
3 See Sagnik Dutta, “From Accommodation to Substantive Equality: Muslim Personal Law, 
Secular Law, and the Indian Constitution 1985–2015,” Asian Journal of Law and Society 4, 
no. 1 (2016): 221.
4 See Katherine Lemons, “At the Margins of Law: Adjudicating Muslim Families in Con-
temporary Delhi,” (PhD Thesis, University of Berkeley, 2010); Gopika Solanki, Adjudi-
cation in Religious Family Laws Cultural Accommodation, Legal Pluralism, and Gender 
Equality in India (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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the paper provides a field view of dispute resolution and the plural legal 
landscape under the rubric of Muslim personal law.
The first section of the paper details the historical background to the 
development of Muslim personal law. The second section situates our field 
study in a Muslim neighbourhood of Kanpur, and details the plural legal 
structures – the religious and the secular tribunals settling matrimonial 
and property disputes. The third section elaborates on the judicial reason-
ing that informs and guides legal praxis at the Darul-Qaza; the intricacies 
of adjudication that address matters of kinship and inheritance. The fourth 
section discusses the different trajectories of dispute resolution in familial 
and matrimonial disputes, and the innovative procedures that involve 
both religious and secular judicial forums in conflict resolution. The paper 
shows through the area of religion-based family law in India how the con-
cept of secularity is constituted as religious and civil rights are negotiated 
by practitioners at different forums of dispute resolution.
1 Muslim Personal Law, its Development and Reform:  
 A Historical Account
The East India Company established its rule in the Indian subcontinent 
following the Battle of Plassey in 1757. Before that, the legal order in India 
had been pluralist with the local authorities responsible for dispute reso- 
lution. The East India Company interfered in judicial proceedings only 
where its business interests were affected. Thus, ‘rule of law’ meant com-
mercial order and not the law in a systematic, and codified sense. In 
1673, the governor of Bombay, Aungier, established panchayats or village 
councils and gave them judicial powers to decide “cases amongst per-
sons of their own castes who agreed to submit the controversies to their 
arbitration.” In 1694, the governor of Bombay commissioned a qazi “to 
be Chief Judge and decider of all differences that may happen in your 
caste-the Moors” (Muslims). Such multiple and parallel systems of local 
adjudication were of no concern to the British in South Asia until well 
into the 18th century. The British judicial process was limited to forts and 
factories at Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras and was intended only for 
royal subjects.
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The East India Company gained military control and was granted the 
status of Diwan of the Mughal Emperor. Under the new regime, British 
officers supervised adjudication by indigenous jurists, pandits and qazis. 
The British officers did not know the local language and customs but were 
aware that their acceptance was not equivalent to the local authorities. The 
British officials undertook the task of translating and publishing Islamic 
and Hindu legal texts. They translated both the texts and concepts into Eng- 
lish, remodelling them around British judicial assumptions. Subsequently, 
the decisions of the qazis came to be increasingly bound by precedents. 
The process of translation of what the British considered authoritative legal 
texts led to codification and systematisation, which separated substantive 
law from procedural law. In this process, Orientalist presumptions and 
utilitarian ideals entered the dialogue.
Historians have argued that the East India Company’s delineation of 
jurisdictions narrowed the scope and flexibility of legal practice during 
this period. By incorporating the qazis into a bureaucratic structure, the 
company delegitimised other local options for adjudication. In this peri-
od, South Asian Muslims found themselves at a greater distance from the 
law they had formerly lived by. The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure 
(1862) relegated indigenous jurists to the role of court officers who assisted 
the jurists. Subsequently, Muslim assistants were debarred from colonial 
courts and Persian legal titles were dispensed with. The 1872 Evidence Act 
removed the Islamic legal elements of testimony and evidence from ‘public 
law’. Nevertheless, elements of Islamic law were retained in a rigid form as 
‘personal’ code governing Muslims.5 In the post-colonial context, Muslim 
personal law exists within the institutional framework of civil law, which 
works in combination with socio-religious forums. The secular state gov-
erns Muslim personal law as seen by the fact that the state has been intro-
ducing legislative and judicial reforms to the domain of Muslim personal 
law since the 1980s.
In the colonial context, Sharia based law underwent transformation 
through reform and codification. Stripped of its social and institutional 
underpinnings, traditional substantive law was modulated as it was applied 
 
5 See Alan Scott Kugle, “Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurispru-
dence in Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (2001): 259–61.
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in different social contexts.6 In other words, the transformation of Sharia 
based law in the colonial context followed entextualisation. Although the 
change facilitated administration for the East India Company, the outcome 
was a curious transformation of fiqh that evolved into state law. Whereas 
Sharia had depended on cooperation between customary and royal law 
with a plurality of opinion as its defining feature, with the formation of the 
modern state, Sharia came to occupy a peripheral and marginal space as 
opposed to the substantive juristic interventions in the colonial context.7
In the 1920s and 1930s, women (We deliberately choose women over 
female as the suggested word sometimes carries a derogatory connotation 
in academia) activists, women’s organisations and Muslim religious lead-
ers called for social transformation through legal reform. In 1929, the All 
India Women’s Conference (AIWC) passed a resolution calling on the In-
dian government to address questions such as inheritance, polygamy, and 
the divorce rights of Muslim women. The 1937 Shariat Application Act 
declared that Muslim personal law would apply to Muslims in all ques-
tions regarding intestate succession (barring those relating to agricultural 
land), including property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or 
any other provision of the personal law. This was followed by 1939 Disso-
lution of Muslim Marriage Act, which aimed to consolidate and clarify the 
provisions of Muslim law regarding suits for marriage dissolution. The act 
stipulated the conditions under which a Muslim woman could divorce and 
stated that the renunciation of Islam or conversion to any other religious 
faith could not be a ground for divorce. Under the Hanafi school of Muslim 
law, a woman could not pursue marriage dissolution in the case of neglect 
by her husband or absence of maintenance from her husband. However, 
the act drew from the Maliki school of law that warranted a Muslim wom-
an’s right to approach a judiciary with a divorce appeal if the whereabouts 
of her husband were not known for four years or on failure to provide 
maintenance.8
6 See Wael B. Hallaq, “Islamic Law: History and Transformation,” in The New Cambridge 
History of Islam, ed. Robert Irwin (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
7 See Hallaq. “Islamic Law,” 169–76.
8 For a detailed history of the legal enactments, see: Rohit De, “Mumtaz Biwi’s broken 
heart: The Many Lives of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act,” Indian Econom-
ic and Social History Review 46, no. 1 (2009); Eleanor Newbegin, “The Codification of 
Personal Law and Secular Citizenship: Revisiting the History of Law Reform in Late Co-
lonial India,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 46, no. 1 (2009); A. Suneetha, 
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Other colonial-period legal reforms had a deep impact on personal law 
in post-colonial India. In 1898, Chapter XXVI of Section 488 of the revised 
Indian Penal Code used ‘vagrancy’ to address the plight of impoverished 
women and children, making those without income and assets the respon-
sibility of their husbands and fathers. The financial burden of maintaining 
women and children was unequivocally placed on the family and not on 
the state. Twenty-six years after Indian independence, the term ‘wife’ was 
expanded to include all women who had been divorced and not remarried. 
Responsibility for their maintenance was placed on the husband. Muslim 
religious leaders objected to this and demanded that the husband face no 
such obligation after divorce.9
Following the Shah Bano case, the Indian National Congress10 govern- 
ment, under Rajiv Gandhi passed the Muslim Women’s Protection of Rights 
on Divorce Act (MWA) entitling divorced Muslim women to ‘reasonable 
and fair maintenance’. Though the act denied a Muslim woman her right 
to maintenance after divorce, it entitled her to a one-off lump sum mainte-
nance payment (mahr) from her husband.11 A Muslim wife has an absolute 
right over her mahr and the amount is settled after taking into account the 
future husband’s ability (hasiyat) to fulfill it (ada karna). The MWA also 
stipulates that if a woman faces difficulty with subsistence, she can appeal 
to a magistrate for maintenance. A ruling could also be issued directing her 
“Indian Secularism and Muslim Personal Law: The Story of Model Nikahnama,” Social 
Difference Online 1 (2011); Sabiha Hussain, “A Socio-historical and Political Discourse 
on the Rights of Muslim Women: Concerns for Women’s Rights or Community Identity 
(Special reference to 1937 and 1939 Acts),” Journal of International Women’s Studies 16, 
no. 2 (2015).
9 A Muslim woman, Shah Bano, filed a maintenance suit in 1978. After forty-six years 
of marriage, her husband had divorced her. She then moved a maintenance suit at the 
Indore High Court for a monthly allowance of five hundred rupees. However, the court 
ruled in favour of maintenance of twenty-five rupees a month. On appeal, the allocated 
amount was raised to one hundred and seventy-nine rupees. Her husband Mohd Ahmed 
Khan appealed to the Supreme Court for relief against the High Court ruling. In 1985, the 
apex court ruled in favour of the High Court judgment. The verdict also provided that 
10,000 rupees would be added to her alimony to cover the legal costs. Muslim leadership 
resented the relief while many Muslim women’s organisations opposed the attempts to 
exclude Muslim women from the purview of 125 CrPC.
10 The National Congress is a political party founded in 1885. It led the freedom movement 
in India and after Independence in 1947 it formed successive governments at the centre.
11 See Sylvia Vatuk, “A Rallying Cry for Muslim Personal Law: The Shah Bano Case and its 
Aftermath,” in Islam in South Asia in Practice, ed. Barbara D. Metcalf (New Delhi: Prince-
ton University Press, 2009).
10
adult children or any of her natal relatives to provide for maintenance. In 
the absence of a family member to provide for her, the court could order 
the state Wakf Board to pay for her.12
Quite counter-intuitively, the MWA had important and beneficial 
implications for Muslim women. Many suits were filed at different High 
Courts with lawyers arguing that the husband’s obligation to pay main-
tenance to their wives should not be confined to the iddat (waiting pe-
riod) after divorce. Invoking Section 3(1)(a) of the act, lawyers alleged 
incompatibility between the inadequate provision of maintenance for in-
digent women and their constitutional rights to life and dignity.13 Many 
High Courts responded to the petitions, allowing financial support under 
‘fair and reasonable provision’ of the act until the divorcee’s remarriage or 
death. Nevertheless, the criticism was made that the act addressed only a 
particular stratum of the population excluding all those claiming remedy 
under Section 125 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure.14
Outlining the history of Muslim personal law, this paper captures the 
proceedings at a Darul-Qaza to understand the nature of disputes and how 
they are resolved. Legal-anthropological studies in India very often rely 
on judgments and court documents. A close scrutiny of legal praxis illus-
trates that the personal law that governs family and marriage is not merely 
an administrative tool but a socio-cultural form of communication that 
is negotiated and facilitated through both formal and alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms. We also know that in many cases, the secu- 
lar judiciary transgresses the boundary of strict legality to argue that it is 
the spirit of law that has currency over legal text.15 The following sections 
12 See Sylvia Vatuk, Marriage and its Discontents: Women, Islam and the Law in India (New 
Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2017), 248–50.
13 See Article 21.
14 Vatuk, Marriage and its Discontents, 264–65. Vatuk observed that, in a majority of cases, 
husbands were not financially stable because of the lack of substantive jobs and a fixed 
income. Thus, they were unable to comply with the court orders even if they were willing 
to do so.
15 In the Shamim Ara v State of UP case (2002), the Supreme Court invalidated triple talaq 
arguing that a mere plea of talaq in response to the judicial proceedings filed by a wife 
for maintenance are not tantamount to marriage dissolution. The liability of a husband 
to pay alimony does not come to an end through such communication. In another case, 
Dagdu Pathan v. Rahimbi Pathan (2002), the Bombay High Court held that a Muslim 
husband cannot repudiate a marriage at will but for the divorce to be effective, it should 
be proven before a competent court as the wife disputes talaq. Riaz Fatima v Mohd Sharif 
(2007) was another case wherein the husband pleaded that he had divorced his wife and 
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situate the institutional framework of dispute resolution forums that were 
available to the Muslim women in the city and show how their religio-legal 
rights were addressed in those forums.
2 Conflict Resolution across Mohalla (Neighbourhood) Panchayat16  
 and the Darul-Qaza
In this section, we will elaborate on a case of adultery and marital conflict 
to show how the deliberations at the Darul-Qaza took place where the cat-
egories of familial duty and neighbourhood (mohalla) were invoked as the 
case unfolded. Following a communal tension, curfew was imposed in the 
Babupurva area of Kanpur (where the Darul-Qaza is located). Even so, an 
elderly petitioner reached the Darul-Qaza. She was accompanied by her 
sister and brother-in-law. She accused her husband of having an illicit rela-
tionship, the reason why she had left home. She told the qazi that if she got 
divorced, she would not take responsibility for her children. Her daughters 
were studying and had to be married soon and she demanded that her 
husband should bear these expenses. Her husband was summoned to the 
Darul-Qaza and responded to her demands by using a different logic. He 
invoked her ‘motherly’ responsibilities to argue that she was in error to 
leave the children. Though he admitted being at fault, he pointed out that 
had the plaintiff been a virtuous woman, under no circumstance would 
she have parted with her children. The qazi deliberated on the complaints 
and suggested that the couple should mitigate their differences. He advised 
the couple to read namaz as that would help them to calm down and work 
towards reconciliation. A settled frame of mind would help them to decide 
on the future course of their marriage.
therefore she was no longer entitled to maintenance. Rejecting the husband’s conten-
tion, the magistrate’s court awarded maintenance to the wife and child. Subsequently, 
an appeal was filed at the Delhi High Court that upheld the Sessions Court’s verdict on 
maintenance. The judiciary took a similar stance in many such cases arguing that it is not 
the letter of law but the principles of justice embedded in the Quran or the Constitution 
that should be prioritised.
16 Panchayat in this context refers to a local tribunal constituted of a few eminent people 
from the neighbourhood and locality. A member may be a local councillor, a religious 
cleric, a businessman, or a social worker, usually a person of high social standing and 
respect in the locality.
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The case was heard over a few months. The husband submitted a few 
conditions to the qazi. First, his wife should return the property purchased 
in her name. Second, she should never raise doubts over his conduct and 
remain obedient to him. In response, the plaintiff questioned how her hus-
band could impose restrictions on her if he was the one at fault. The matri- 
monial dispute did not remain confined to the couple and their children 
(who regularly visited the Darul-Qaza, sometimes without their parents). 
Soon, the neighbours from the mohalla became involved in the dispute. 
The husband argued that neither his relatives nor the neighbours wanted 
his wife to return. He feared that he would be ostracised if he accepted his 
wife without reprimanding her for her conduct. He insisted on a written 
apology (mafinama) from his wife, that he would show to his neighbours 
and acquaintances in case they objected to her return. The qazi drew up a 
temporary settlement that stated that the father would bear the expenses of 
his children and their mother would look after them. At this, the plaintiff 
dismissed the settlement and stated that if her husband refused to recog-
nise the rights due to her, she would not accept the responsibility of the 
children. She argued that her husband should either leave the other woman 
or marry her so that she could know how much he spends on her. The hus-
band denied the alleged affair while the wife remained firm in her claims. 
Witnesses from the neighbourhood were brought to the Darul-Qaza by the 
husband and the children evoked the mohalla on several occasions when 
they argued on behalf of their mother.
This case showcases the concept of mohalla as a ‘corporate person’ so 
to speak, wherein interventions by the leaders of the mohalla were an im-
portant avenue of conflict resolution. We also came across a complicated 
case of divorce (khula) where the husband had eloped with his wife’s 
younger sister but had not divorced his wife, the elder sister. About three 
years after the elopement, his wife appealed for khula at the Darul-Qaza. 
The husband opposed this and expressed his wish to restore the marriage. 
When the plaintiff visited the Darul-Qaza with her parents, the counsel-
ling sessions were frequently interrupted by emotional outbursts about the 
husband’s ‘shameful’ conduct. As a result, the case became protracted with 
no resolution in sight. As the Darul-Qaza could not reach any conclusion, 
a neighbourhood panchayat was convened at the sisters’ family’s request. A 
settlement (samjhauta) was drawn up whereby the wife got a khula while 
her sister was married to the divorced husband. The case which could not 
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be resolved at the Darul-Qaza was settled at the mohalla forum. These two 
cases illustrate how the process of conflict resolution cuts across religious 
and social forums and how the redressal mechanisms work at the local 
level. The debates around codification of Muslim personal law do not cap-
ture the complexities of personal disputes that can be captured only at the 
forums of dispute resolution.17
During our interviews with community leaders, we were told that the 
Deoband-affiliated Darul-Qaza in Kanpur was set up to serve the city.18 
The tribunal also caters to plaintiffs from other towns and cities. It is man-
datory that the adjudicator should be competent to adjudicate and set-
tle family disputes. Decision-making (sahi nirnay) or the qazi’s discretion 
depends on how conversant he is with Sharia. However, before approach-
ing a dispute resolution unit, one or both the partners in marriage must try 
and resolve their dispute within the family or the lineage or in the caste-
like biradaris.19 The decision is either for marriage restoration (sulha) or to 
part ways (alaigi). When couples approach a neighbourhood jamaat with 
a matrimonial dispute, the concerned mediator will caution the partner 
who is proven to be at fault to mend his/her ways.20 The mediators from the 
neighbourhood who act as a counsellor/negotiator could be the local imam, 
a notable person or a local power-broker/politician. Members of the local 
municipality and mohalla panchayat will sometimes be invited to mediate 
and arbitrate in disputes. The local forums work with a close knowledge of 
the case. Unlike the formal law, these forums do not get into the tediousness 
of establishing the facts in a case. Instead, a mediator, adjudicator or an arbi-
trator, approaches the conflicting parties with prior ‘knowledge’ of the case. 
17 When we interviewed the Superintendent of Police in charge of the area, he observed that 
many cases of conflict are resolved by the residents themselves.
18 The Deoband movement emanated from Daru’l-‘ulum Deoband (founded in 1866) 
propagated Islamic revivalist and anti-imperialist ideas. The initiative was meant to rec-
tify the seeming lack of religious education among Muslims of British India, as religious 
clerics feared a loss of identity with the mushrooming of English-language education 
and Western values in the society (Dietrich Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 63). Muhammad Qasim Nanaotavi and Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi were the principal founders of the seminary and the movement. The Deoband 
school has exerted its influence throughout India and abroad as a learned reference insti-
tution marked by orthodoxy, puritanism and asceticism (Dietrich Reetz, “Dār al-’Ulūm 
Deoband and its Mediatic Self-Representation,” Islamic studies 44, no. 2 (2005): 211).
19 Biradaris are caste groups, in this case, among Muslims whose members follow a particu-
lar occupation.
20 Jamaats are local councils.
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Familiarity develops from being a member of the community and having 
access to all the parties concerned in a dispute. This changes the tenor of the 
litigation process and how the adversaries exercise agency in claiming their 
rights. The following section documents the polyphony of legal praxis by 
tracing the cases that are brought to the Darul-Qaza for dispute settlement.
3 Adjudication, Arbitration and Counselling: Qazi Justice in Context
Of the hundred cases that were followed by us at the Darul-Qaza, the key 
grievances brought by women were domestic violence, desertion, non- 
payment of maintenance and family quarrels (mostly over resources). 
Women filed suits against their husbands and in-laws. Complaints were 
also registered for emotional trauma caused by extramarital liaison, includ-
ing incestuous relations. Some wives complained that they faced constant 
pressure to submit to demands to give sexual favours to their husbands’ 
friends and acquaintances. About thirty women complained that they were 
forced to bring money from their parents. Where they refused, they were 
subjected to cruel treatment. Women also approached the Darul-Qaza 
with appeals for divorce and maintenance suits. A few of the cases brought 
to the Darul-Qaza were disputes over inheritance and property.
Petitioners very often approached the Darul-Qaza for mediation in 
family quarrels. Women reported cases of domestic violence and harass-
ment by their husbands and in-laws. It was reported that a husband teased 
and abused his wife for not having brought enough dowry. Women fre-
quently complained of cruelty at the hands of female relatives – a sister-
in-law and/or mother-in-law. In one case, the perpetrator was the woman’s 
step-daughter who fought with her father’s new wife as she resented him 
marrying without first arranging her own marriage. In these cases, the qazi 
pointed out that according to Islam, it is not the duty of the daughter-in-
law to take care of her in-laws. The son is responsible for his parents, and 
if his sister where her father is absent. It is also the husband’s obligation to 
provide for his wife and ensure her well-being. In the family battles that 
involved a wife and her sister-in-law or mother-in-law, the qazi advised the 
husband to set up a separate household with his wife. This offered a chance 
to avoid conflicts between the wife and the other family members over 
control and management of the family resources.
15
It was observed that in his deliberations, the qazi made efforts to re-
solve disputes by diffusing inter-personal conflicts. The task at hand was 
not to uphold Sharia but to mediate with the conflicting parties and offer 
good counsel. There were times when the women petitioners visited the 
qazi to clarify doubts on the status of their marriage.21 When a husband 
repeatedly threatened his wife with talaq, the apprehensive wife inquired 
whether such threats had revoked their marriage.22 In other cases, couples 
came to clarify whether a husband’s pronouncement of talaq in a fit of rage 
and under the influence of alcohol annulled their marriage. In such cases, 
the key word was ‘intention’. When it was found that talaq was pronounced 
under the influence of alcohol or used as a threat, it was not considered a 
legitimate divorce. Studies have shown that when validating marriage dis-
solution, adjudicators concentrate on intention. Qazis investigate the back-
ground of the litigants and the particular context and circumstances of the 
cases in order to reach a judgment.23 Queries are also brought to the qazi 
regarding the validity of marriage where there was insinuation of incest 
between a husband and his sister or a mother. Parents appealed to find 
out about difficult situations such as a divorced daughter who conceived 
while observing iddat and later remarried. The father requested that the 
marriage be deemed null and void and the child considered illegitimate. A 
qazi’s opinion was also sought in a case where a divorced couple remarried 
each other while they were observing iddat. Was the remarriage legal?
21 A woman petitioner told Suchandra Ghosh how worship (ibadat) does not merely imply 
fasting, offering namaz and paying zakat. It encompasses the everyday life of an individ-
ual. In an event of talaq pronouncement (by the husband), it is the responsibility of the 
couple to accept the pronouncement and separate.
22 There are three desirable modes of talaq pronouncement:
1.  A husband may pronounce three separate repudiations during the three successive 
states of purity from menstruation (paki) of his wife.
2.  A husband may issue talaq (talaq-e-ehsan) in a month making no effort towards 
conciliation in the following two months, and as a result, the marriage is dissolved. 
Two months imply two distinct menstrual cycles she has undergone after the talaq 
pronouncement. But it is two pronouncements made; then it is talaq-e-sunnat.
3.  A marriage may be annulled by talaq-ul-bain where there is a single talaq pro-
nouncement, but the marriage becomes void with immediate effect. Here the in-
tention of the partners is crucial who want to dissolve their marriage. However, the 
relationship may be restored without observing halala, and for that, the couple will 
have to remarry each other by nikah.
23 See Erin Stiles, An Islamic Court in Context: An Ethnographic Study of Judicial Reasoning 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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Often the petitioners looked for financial redress when they ap-
proached the Darul-Qaza. Nikah is a contract and by entering into it, 
one fulfils a social obligation. As a prospective bride and groom publicly 
acknowledge and recognise each other as spouses, the responsibility to 
maintain (kharcha) the wife falls on the husband and the wife is expected 
to remain obedient to him. Nevertheless, the notions of adequate finance 
and obedience are matters of interpretation in real life. As the Darul-Qaza 
deliberated and adjudicated on maintenance in a marriage, the complexi-
ties of maintenance, kinship, domestic violence and sexuality emerged as key 
themes.24 We found that petitioners approached the Darul-Qaza for mainte-
nance settlements even after decrees had been issued by civil tribunals.
At the Darul-Qaza, the largest number of cases were divorce appeals by 
women. By khula, a wife appeals (mutalva) for divorce from her husband 
and in lieu has to let go her mahr and nafaka, i. e. maintenance due to her 
during iddat.25 While they need not come to a Darul-Qaza to plead for 
khula, women are very often compelled to seek mediation by a qazi due 
to their husband’s reluctance to respond to their divorce appeal. In cases 
when the qazi was convinced that a husband was withholding khula to 
harass his wife and was not committed to the relationship or did not have 
the capacity or intention to fulfil his duties to his wife, the qazi dissolved 
the marriage by faskh. It was often pointed out at the Darul-Qaza that it is 
a husband’s responsibility to provide his wife with food (khan-pan), shel-
ter (ghar-makan) and sex (gosalbzi ki farz/haq pe zauziyat). Some women 
complained of desertion by their husbands. Most of them had children and 
no income to support them. They were depending on either their parents 
24 Judith Tucker explored marriage practices and the associated entitlements for women in 
Syria and Palestine in the 17th and 18th centuries. She found that a marriage, once con-
summated, would make a husband liable for certain responsibilities. Husbands thus pro-
vided for their wives and children and the obligations were binding on them irrespective 
of the wives’ ownership and control over resources. The social norms required a husband 
to provide adequately, i.e. in line with her background. See Judith E. Tucker, “Muftīs and 
Matrimony: Islamic Law and Gender in Ottoman Syria and Palestine,” Islamic Law and 
Society 1, no. 3 (1994): 269.
25 According to Islam, a husband has to give mahr, an agreed upon amount, before he con-
summates his marriage. While the bride has an absolute right over the mahr decided, 
the amount is determined based on the socio-economic status of the families concerned. 
However, in North India today, it is almost normative for women to either defer the mahr 
or agree to their husbands postponing the payment. Sometimes the wife also lets go of 
her mahr (maf). This is the reason why when the husband approaches a Darul-Qaza for 
a divorce certificate the qazi orders the payment of mahr to the wife.
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or brothers. In such cases, the qazi intervened by appealing to the husband 
to restore their marriage and take charge of their families. When such pleas 
went unheeded, the qazi annulled the marriage to let the wife remarry if 
she wanted to. He would state conscientiously that a man should marry 
only when he thinks that he can fulfil the responsibilities to his wife. Oth-
erwise, he should practice restraint and have control over his urges (nafs). 
The qazi often referred to the Quran to clarify that it is a duty to control 
one’s urges rather than marry and spoil another life.
Sometimes the petitioners approached the Darul-Qaza to clarify their 
doubts regarding their shares in inheritance. The female petitioners came to 
appeal over what they perceived as a breach of their rights (haq). They ap-
pealed to the moral authority of the qazi, drawing his attention to the (mis)
conduct of certain family members. Many visited the Darul-Qaza for consul-
tation and counselling over personal matters. Apart from the solutions that 
the Darul-Qaza dispensed in cases of conflicts, its availability as an accessible 
counselling space in the neighbourhood motivated many petitioners to bring 
cases that did not always fall within its jurisdiction. In one instance, two sisters 
came to the Darul-Qaza in tears, and told the qazi that they feared that their 
brother had been abducted by his in-laws. In this case, the qazi’s role was to 
console the petitioners and guide them to lodge their complaints at the local 
police station. The cases bring to fore the divergent concerns under personal 
law, religious, matrimonial and property rights as much the dilemmas over 
morality and piety of conduct. Yet, in discourse pertaining to reform, the focus 
remains on the legal aspects and gender justice while the questions of what 
exactly is at stake in the realm of personal law has remained, unaddressed.26
More than 90% of the petitioners in the cases observed were women. 
Most of them came from a low-income group. Often, they did not have the 
necessary financial support to even travel to court or the free legal centres 
in order to obtain judicial relief.27 Many felt embarrassed to reach out and 
discuss marital problems beyond the familiar domains of the neighbour-
26 Farrah Ahmed argues that, in India, discussions on the personal law, have undermined 
the value of religious freedom in overemphasising the question of gender justice. See 
Farrah Ahmed, Religious Freedom under the Personal Law System (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 2.
27 The Family Court Act of 1984 allows a party to appoint a lawyer only with prior permis-
sion from the court. This is a procedural code that does not confer substantive rights, 
neither does it alter the rights provided under a personal law. Arguably, in this instance, 
litigants have more control when there is no lawyer.
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hood and locality. Some had migrated to other cities and found them-
selves in marital distress in an unfamiliar environment. In those cases, the 
qazi assured the plaintiffs that the Darul-Qaza would take prompt action 
regarding their disputes and issue a ruling in their ‘best interest’. Given 
the high level of illiteracy among women (53% in rural areas and 47% in 
urban areas) in the community, factors such as ignorance of the law, ‘fear 
of the court’ caused by judicial complexity and uncertainty of the outcome, 
were sometimes the reasons litigants chose the Darul-Qaza over a court 
for dispute resolution.28 Many women were apprehensive that they would 
face stigma and social censure if they pursued their cases in the formal 
courts. Most importantly, at the Darul-Qaza, the petitioners argued their 
case without worrying about the legal merit of their arguments.
Petitioners often approached the Darul-Qaza with problems that in-
volved disclosing intimate details of their lives. The Darul-Qaza, to their 
mind, offered a space for such discussions on intimacy. The appellants often 
said that they trusted the Darul-Qaza and had faith in it and its incumbents. 
When its employees showed care, concern and empathy in handling the dis-
putes, women felt empowered to speak about their real problems.29 The qazi’s 
familiarity with the neighbourhood and the discretion that both the qazi and 
assistant qazi maintained were reasons why the women felt they could ap-
proach this forum. We argue that the discourse on religious family law needs 
to move beyond issues of legality and gender justice towards a different un-
derstanding of the ‘personal’ in personal law. The polyphony of legal praxis 
shows how questions of kinship expectations, affect and resolutions offered 
in Sharia are interpreted based on the case at hand. The secular judiciary is 
approached and civil remedies are sought whenever necessary in order to 
resolve the conflict and make the parties agree to a settlement (samjhauta).
28 The Sachar Committee Report (2006).
29 In one instance, a female litigant suddenly became conscious of Suchandra Ghosh’s pres-
ence in the unit and asked the qazi for privacy. The qazi sensed her concern and took her 
to a quieter corner of the room. 
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4 Towards an Inter-Legal Structure and the Making of Evidence
This section examines how Muslim family cases work through both the re-
ligious and the civil tribunals leading to the creation of a plural legal land-
scape where the cases are authenticated/supported by one another. The 
dual life of a case in religious and civil forums can be initiated by a litigant, 
or it may emerge as a requirement for a judicial procedure. At times, the 
procedural requirements make it necessary for a Darul-Qaza to seek help 
from the magistrate’s court. On other occasions, a civil court is approached 
for its enforceable authority. In this section, we will discuss how an intri-
cate pattern of interlegality sets in motion as the litigants seek resolution 
and redressal on matters ranging from family quarrels to bitter disputes 
over maintenance. We have found cases where the civil court sought in-
tervention from the Darul-Qaza to assist in delivering justice to the con-
flicting parties. This practice is based on the recognition of the expertise of 
the qazis in interpreting the intricacies of Islamic law as well as their local 
knowledge. We have seen how verdicts pronounced in the religious forum 
are used as evidence in a civil/family court’s decision-making just as civil 
court’s rulings served as basis for proceeding with dispute resolution at a 
Darul-Qaza.
Can a Darul-Qaza enforce a post-divorce maintenance settlement giv-
en that its orders do not have any legal standing and are therefore not bind-
ing on the litigants? We found that the implementation of agreements on 
maintenance command compliance as the parties come to the agreement 
through long deliberations.30 In our discussions with the lawyers and judg-
es at the trial court, it was pointed out that while a Darul-Qaza could han-
dle issues regarding marriage and divorce, for maintenance and property 
settlements, petitioners had no choice but to approach a civil court. We 
found that the issue of enforceability was an important one and it is often a 
procedural requirement in settling property disputes. If a Darul-Qaza’s em-
ployees were concerned that a settlement made at the Darul-Qaza might be 
30 Sylvia Vatuk, “Divorce at the Wife’s Initiative in Muslim Personal Law: What are the Op-
tions and what are their Implications for Women’s Welfare?,” in Redefining Family Law 
in India, ed. Archana Parashar and Amita Dhanda (London: Routledge, 2008), 216–17: 
Vatuk found that Darul-Qazas in Hyderabad and Chennai implemented informal sanc-
tions in post-divorce maintenance cases in order to ensure the enforceability of their 
judgments. Qazis withheld divorce certificates until husbands had compensated the 
post-divorce claims of their wives.
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breached, they advised the petitioners to invoke the authority of the civil 
court. Sometimes a parallel ruling by a family court on the same dispute or 
even a mere certification by a notary strengthened and validated a religious 
tribunal’s decision on a dispute. However, documentation and ratification 
of verdicts by a civil authority does not inevitably lead to its acceptance by 
the clients. Legal anthropologists have cited cases wherein contentions to 
legal settlements were duly cognised and acted upon to usher in a fresh 
perspective on the case.31
The civil court, on the other hand, directed cases to the Darul-Qaza 
for the latter’s competence and expertise on family matters. Nevertheless, 
pluralism in procedure between religious and civil courts was sometimes 
invoked to elicit a ruling on a dispute that could be used as evidence in 
another tribunal. Often, the admissions from the defendant in a suit were 
adduced at another tribunal. In one instance, we found a property dispute 
that was sent to the Darul-Qaza for a verdict so that this could be used in 
the civil court as evidence.32
A petitioner pursuing a civil suit on a property at the Fatehpur District 
Court (Uttar Pradesh) visited the Darul-Qaza in Kanpur. He approached 
the forum anticipating that at this forum, his adversaries would admit ‘true’ 
facts about the dispute, which he would then produce as evidence at the 
Kanpur civil court. But his efforts were in vain as his opponents refused to 
appear before the qazi. The defendants submitted that they would respond 
to the Darul-Qaza’s summons if the plaintiff withdrew the civil suit. The 
plaintiff was opposed to the idea of dropping the lawsuit as he was not 
sure if the qazi would issue a favourable verdict. But he wanted to know 
his rightful dues in the disputed property from the qazi. This case under-
lines that while people turn to the Darul-Qaza when seeking the admission 
of facts, expediency, and efficiency, its rulings are not enforceable. Some-
times, the Darul-Qaza recognises a civil/criminal ruling as evidence. In 
one case, a petitioner’s husband was convicted of rape. She appealed for 
31 See John Bowen, “Fairness and Law in an Indonesian Court,” in Dispensing Justice in 
Muslim Courts: Qadis, Procedures and Judgments, ed. M. Khalid Masud, David S. Powers, 
and Ruud Peters (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 187–88. 
32 For details of this case, see Suchandra Ghosh and Anindita Chakrabarti, “Adjudica-
tion of Personal Law and the Question of Secularity: An Analysis of Judicial Practice in 
Darul-Qazas of Uttar Pradesh,” in Religion and Secularities: Reconfigurations of Islam in 
Contemporary India, ed. Anindita Chakrabarti and Sudha Sitharaman (New Delhi: Ori-
ent Blackswan, forthcoming).
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divorce with a copy of the judgment. She pleaded with the qazi to recognise 
the criminal court’s verdict as evidence and dissolve the marriage by faskh. 
In cases where wives refused to return to their matrimonial homes, hus-
bands registered cases for marriage restoration (rukhsati) at a family court. 
In many such cases, with wives not appearing for the hearings, ex parte 
judgments were passed by civil courts in the husbands’ favour. Submitting 
the rulings to the Darul-Qaza, husbands sought solutions to their marital 
disputes. The qazi’s role in the cases was to arrange meetings between the 
parties in the presence of their families and work towards a dispute settle-
ment. In rare cases, the partners reconciled their differences and agreed to 
a marriage restoration. Most of the cases ended in divorce.
As we understand law not in terms of the state, but in terms of ‘author-
ity’ and ‘institutions’, legal pluralism, John Griffiths has argued, needs to 
be understood with respect to the group concerned and their positioning 
in relation to the state and its laws. By focusing on institutions and their 
interactive context in this paper, we shift the focus of analysis from the 
normative expectations of law to actual behaviour in a pluralistic social 
setting. As the qazi discerns the facts in a case, ideas of evidence at the 
Darul-Qaza differ from those that would be admissible in a court of law. In 
one instance, where impotence was cited as a ground for divorce, the qazis 
requested medical records. However, the husband’s silence (khamoshi) was 
ultimately deemed to be sufficient evidence to support the wife’s allegation 
and khula was granted to her. Drawing on legal reasoning which is both 
‘institutionally distinctive’ and ‘culturally recognisable’, the qazi reasoned 
his way to the final decision.33 In the cases studied, the qazi’s embedded-
ness in the local social fabric redefined his role as an efficient and effective 
arbitrator. He exercised discretion based on his perception of how argu-
mentation and silences work as evidence in a case. Decision-making de-
pended not merely on the ‘facts’ of a case documented but the potential 
consequences that a judgment may have upon the individual litigants.
In this section we have shown how judicial procedure in adjudication 
of personal law very often crosses the boundary between the religious and 
the non-religious (what we have called the civil legal forums) and how they 
function in collocation. In a pluralist secular democracy such as India, 
where both religious and civil tribunals adjudicate on personal matters, 
33 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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procedural innovation and cross-forum evidence-making raise interesting 
questions for our theories of secularity. Legal pluralism, in this context, 
conditions, coordinates and collaborates with the judicial process and the 
adjudication procedure of the respective courts/forums that engage in the 
resolution of disputes pertaining to Muslim personal law.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides an ethnography of the secular and shows that what 
permeates the practice of secularity in a post-colonial multicultural nation- 
state is an acute entanglement of the domain of the religious and the state. 
This argument is not far from Talal Asad’s observation on family law re-
form in Egypt.34 Asad traced the transformations in the idea of the law and 
legal system in colonial Egypt that helped to make secularism a thinkable, 
practical proposal. To identify the emergence of social spaces within which 
secularism could develop, Asad focused on the ways in which legal institu-
tions, religious authority and ethics transformed over a period of time. He 
stated that one of the most important ways this was achieved was through 
family law reform. As the legal formation of the family gave the notion of 
individual morality its own private locus, Sharia could then be spoken of as 
the law of personal status. Sharia thus became a secular formula, defining a 
locus in which religion is permitted to make its public appearance through 
state law.35 We relate to this insight and extend it to argue that the adju-
dication of family law in a plural legal context illustrates how continuous 
negotiations mutually constitute our ‘religious’ as well as ‘citizen’ rights in 
a secular nation-state.
Contemporary adjudication under Muslim personal law in India prob-
lematises the boundary between religion and law. We argue that the letter 
of religion-based personal law needs to be understood with the complex-
ities and nuances of the application of said law in mind. Lawyers, litigants 
and kin approach the Darul-Qaza and other religious institutions and the 
state-affiliated family courts work in collaboration towards mitigating 
family disputes.36 This ethnography illustrates how Muslim personal law 
34 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
35 Rosen, Anthropology of Justice, 229–31.
36 For studies in other contexts, see Sylvia Vatuk, “Muslim Women in the Indian Family 
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functions through different forums where the boundaries between the 
religious and the civil are necessarily porous as resolution is very often 
achieved with the help of a religious authority as well as civil sanctions.37 
As the nature of the disputes in question guided the litigants’ choice to ap-
proach a certain forum of conflict resolution, adjudication and settlement 
of disputes often brought the religious and civil in necessary conversation 
with one another. This dialogue was hinged on evidence-making, proce-
dure and the question of expediency as much as it was based on interpret-
ing the law.
Anthropologists have often argued that a strict implementation of the 
legal code at times jeopardises its benevolent intent and risks hurting the 
interests of those seeking relief in law. At the Darul-Qaza, we witnessed 
how the judicial discretion exercised by the qazi instilled confidence in 
the female litigants who perceived the Darul-Qaza as a site for speaking 
about unique problems or oppression in marriage. The qazi was perceived 
as someone who could help when there were very few options available for 
dispute resolution.38 However, the religious forums never had any locus 
standi in law. This situation was rectified in 2014 with the Vishwa Lochan 
Madan judgement where the Supreme Court legitimised Darul-Qazas as 
an effective alternative dispute resolution site. Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court judges used the argument of expediency and efficiency to legitimise 
the existence of Darul-Qazas and not that of religious freedom or secular-
ism. The Vishwa Lochan Madan judgment showed an understanding of 
the real processes of dispute resolution under Muslim personal law that 
took place at multiple forums depending on the nature of the case.
In the post-colonial secular state, the debate on personal law has been 
between the enactment of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) – symbolising unity 
Courts: A Report from Chennai,” in Divorce and Remarriage among Muslims in India, ed. 
Imtiaz Ahmed (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2003), 144; Lemons, “At the Margins of 
Law”; Solanki, Adjudication in Religious Family Laws.
37 For ethnographic details engaging with these questions, see Ghosh and Chakrabarti, “Ad-
judication of Personal Law.”
38 Similar findings have been articulated in studies conducted in other regions. See Nahda 
Shehada, “Negotiating Custody Rights in Islamic Family Law,” in Permutations of Order: 
Religion and Law as Contested Sovereignties, ed. Thomas G. Kirsch and Bertram Turner 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 258; Susan Hirsch, “Kadhi’s Courts as Complex Sites of Re-
sistance: The State, Islam and Gender in Postcolonial Kenya,” in Contested States: Law, 
Hegemony and Resistance, ed. Mindie Lazarus-Black and Susan F. Hirsch (New York: 
Routledge, 1994).
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and integrity of the nation – and preserving personal laws in order to protect 
the pluralist ethos of a multicultural state. Going beyond this binary, in this 
paper we have explored a field view of dispute resolution within what falls 
under Muslim personal law. Here, justice lies not in the invocation of ‘laws’ 
but in contextual assessments and a keen understanding of familial rights 
and duties. When we asked how similar cases resulting in different judg-
ments could be justified, the qazis offered the following answer: first, no two 
individuals are identical, and hence no two cases are the same. They insisted 
that the same reasoning process entailing drawing of analogies, weighing 
carefully the moral implications, adducing evidence, and gauging social in-
terest, may reasonably lead to different conclusions. The discussion of Mus-
lim personal law has focused too much on state institutions and political 
rhetoric regarding the desired legal reform, failing to reflect on the broader 
range of contexts in which it operates.
In the Indian context, legal pluralism operates through procedural and 
institutional cooperation and collocation between religious and civil insti-
tutions. In this context, the qazi, police, magistrate’s courts (and, at times, 
women’s organisations) are aware of one another’s presence and resolutions 
are sought bearing in mind this plural legal landscape. Interlegality is in-
voked as both a norm and legal praxis. These matters are as much subjects 
of religio-ethical practice as they are matters of citizens’ rights. This paper 
helps us rethink the question of religion-based personal law and secularity 
as we follow the process of adjudication and dispute resolution in situ. It 
contributes to the recent conceptualisations of secularity as a historically 
changing concept in its cultural meaning.39 We find echoes of this histori-
cally emergent concept of secularity in the idea of ‘contextual secularism’ as 
proposed by Rajeev Bhargava. Bhargava views secularism as a multi-value 
doctrine with internal discord among its constitutive values. According to 
Bhargava, contextual secularism recognises that a conflict between indi-
vidual and group rights cannot always be adjudicated by taking recourse 
to abstract principles. Rather, cases are settled by balancing between com-
peting claims.40 The adjudication at the Darul-Qaza shows how Muslim 
women negotiate between two sets of rights: rights given to them by the 
39 See Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Towards a Cul-
tural Sociology of Secular Modernities,” Comparative Sociology 11, no. 6 (2012).
40 See Rajeev Bhargava, “States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism,” The 
Hedgehog Review 12, no. 3 (2010).
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religious community, embedded in kinship relations, and those granted by 
the secular democratic state. While in theory, they are firm opposites, the 
ethnography of adjudication under personal law shows how in practice the 
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